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The Need for Professional Society Advocacy for a Laboratory-acquired Illness/Incident Reporting and Analysis System Biosafety professionals have long recognized the value of information derived from the reporting and analysis of laboratoryacquired illnesses (LAIs). Analysis of events surrounding an exposure event which resulted in an LAI has been used to identify equipment and facility design issues and flaws in operational procedures, as well as the hazard ous characteristics of biological agents that are being stud ied or manipulated. Information obtained from the investi gation and analysis of LAIs is a valuable resource for as sessing risks posed by proposed work with pathogens, de signing and selecting protective equipment and facilities, and developing agentspecific occupational health and sur veillance programs. Lessons learned from analyzing LAIs also can provide a basis for developing educational tools in the form of case studies and utilized for training laboratory workers, principal investigators, and biosafety professionals.
Some institutions such as the U.S. Army Medical Re search Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) have a good track record of reporting and publishing exposure events that have resulted in LAIs and continue to look for new ways to present this information to the lifesciences community and their stakeholders (CDC, 2000; Mabeus, 2012; Rusnak, 2004 . Unfortunately, institutions that rou tinely report and share lessons learned from LAIs remain the exception rather than the rule. All institutions that have experienced LAIs should be encouraged to share with the larger lifescience community, via publication in scientific journals or reporting in another accessible resource LAI related information and analysis of the event. Sharing the nature of the incident, the probable cause, and lessons learned with relevant stakeholders would allow many indi viduals and facilities to benefit from an unfortunate event (Kozlovac, 2011) .
One hallmark of an organization that incorporates safe ty as an institutional value within its organizational culture is encouraging employee participation in reporting acci dents, near misses, and unsafe conditions. Another hall mark is that the organization's leadership has established a mechanism to investigate reported issues and ensure cor rective actions are identified, documented, and communi cated to relevant staff in a timely manner.
Although most organizations have developed internal reporting mechanisms, perhaps one of the disincentives for an organization to report and share information on LAIs and incidents with the broader community is the absence of an easy, voluntary mechanism for sharing LAI information. Indeed, a central theme common to published LAI research within the scientific literature-beginning with the first surveys conducted by Kisskalt (1915) , continuing with the collective work of Sulkin and Pike (1951, 1979) , and the more recent reviews by Sewell (1995), Harding and Byers (2000) , and Weinstein and Singh (2009)-is that LAI risk determination is hampered by the lack of a systematic re porting mechanism at the regional, national, or internation al level. Indeed, biosafety professionals have intermittently discussed the need and recommended the establishment of such a system for many years. Unfortunately, establishing such a system has been beset with many challenges and obstacles, including a lack of sustained advocacy from pro fessional biosafety organizations.
Building Awareness and Advocacy
Over the past several years, spawned by the expansion of high and maximumcontainment research and diagnos tic facilities, there has been a growing awareness by policy makers and the public regarding the potential risk for work er exposure to biological hazards and the possibility of en vironmental release. In the United States, this awareness and concern has led to the publication of several reports by government and stakeholder groups focusing on various aspects of safety in laboratories that work with biological hazards. A number of these reports, including the 2009 TransFederal Taskforce Report on Biosafety and Biocon tainment Oversight, and the 2010 U.S. Government Ac countability Office (GAO) report 10850 (Biological La boratories: Design and Implementation Considerations for Safety Reporting Systems), discuss the need and value of a centralized incidentreporting, analysis, and information sharing capability, which would be a valuable resource for scientists, biosafety professionals, and medical profession als in identifying risks associated with research, diagnostic, and largescale work with biological agents.
Indeed, the United States and other international part ners are engaged in preliminary discussions about the development of an LAI/incident reporting and analysis system. Other industries such as aviation, nuclear power, and patient care have successfully established incident reporting systems and have benefited from these systems by identifying equipment and procedural hazards and gaps in oversight, and by identifying and communicating best practices. Based on the level of interest and awareness by policymakers and the public in research, diagnostic, and production activities involving biohazardous agents, the time is ripe to implement an LAI/incident reporting and analysis system at the national and perhaps even the inter national level.
How can biosafety professionals have an impact on this discussion? The answer is to ensure that our profes sional associations actively advocate for the creation of an LAI/incident reporting and analysis system. I would like to share a few ideas about how professional organizations such as the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) and its U.S. and international affiliates, partners, and stakeholders can advance our common goal in ensuring that lessons learned from incidents resulting in exposures, laboratoryacquired illnesses, and releases outside of con tainment are shared and used for beneficial purposes.
• ABSA and other professional associations with an in terest in biological safety should actively advocate for the establishment of a voluntary, incidentreporting system. This system should be coupled with a centralized, integrat ed mechanism for analyzing incidents and reporting infor mation and lessons learned from both mandatory reports provided by a nation's regulatory authorities and the volun tary reporting system. Biosafety professionals can provide expertise and advice about many of the technical obstacles that a government agency would encounter as it attempts to implement such a system (e.g., the development of clearly defined terminology). Once such a system is developed, professional societies can help disseminate lessons learned from reported incidents and LAIs and inform their mem bers, partners, and stakeholders about the value of partici pating in a voluntary LAI/incident reporting and analysis system program. Until such an LAI/incident reporting, anal ysis, and informationsharing system is developed, profes sional societies should encourage individuals and institu tions to publish data on LAIs and incidents in their journals. ABSA and its affiliate organizations should also consider developing other LAI forums in which biosafety profession als and relevant stakeholders can share their experiences.
• Professional societies such as ABSA should expand their educational offerings to include a course on accident/ incident investigations. ABSA and its affiliates have played a critical role in providing educational opportunities for their members and stakeholders. The number of training opportunities and breadth of biosafetyrelated topics have increased dramatically during the 25 years in which I have been involved in biological safety. A recognized core com petency of a biosafety professional is the ability to conduct an accident/incident investigation and develop the incident/ accident report. In my opinion, this is one of our most im portant functions, and our professional society should de velop a standard course for biosafety professionals that review basic epidemiology, how to conduct and document an incident investigation, and how to develop a corrective action plan.
• Biosafety professionals and their professional societies should strongly advocate the need to include biosafety prin ciples and practices as part of the lifesciences curriculum at the undergraduate and graduate university levels. Once that educational gap has been recognized by our institutions of higher learning, ABSA and its partners could work with universities to develop such a curriculum. Incorporating biosafetyrelated educational requirements would discour age the spread of poor or unsafe practices from lab to lab and generation to generation.
Scientists and policymakers at the highest levels of government are now engaged in discussing biosafety and biosafetyrelated issues. If biosafety professionals and their professional societies seize the opportunity to advocate for the establishment of an LAI/incident reporting and analysis system nationally and internationally and provide leader ship on improving education about biosafety principles and practices, we can help prevent laboratoryacquired infec tions and accidents.
Rusnak, J. M., Kortepeter, M. G., Aldis, J., & Boudreau, E. (2004 , marks the end of more than 8 months of widely reported controversy over whether some of the data now freely accessible should be withheld in the public interest." In addition to the science that fueled an international debate, this issue includes articles that provide critical perspectives on the issues. Fauci & Collins, 2012, define the public health problem of Influenza, the benefit to society of research that ultimately provides better prevention and treatment and DURC. Frankel (2012) discusses the potential consequences of regulating dualuse research, including the impact on the relationship of science and government. Careful riskbenefit analysis in determining what research should be done is advocated in Lipsitch, 2012; however, the author cautions readers that current knowledge of influenza transmissibility is limited. A dialogue on implementation of the new U.S. DURC policy is begun in the Wolinetz article. A perspective on the feasibility of some aspects of biosecurity is presented by Schneier. Finally, the human populations' vulnerability to H5N1 infection, the hope for a universal influenza vaccine, and strategies to minimize the potential for global influenza pandemics are discussed (Rappuoli & Dormitzer, 2012) . The articles clearly present issues that must be part of the dialogue between biosafety professionals, scientific researchers, government, and societyatlarge. All articles accessed June 23, 2012.
